Action for cities : the Thatcher government and inner city policy by Saumarez Smith, Otto
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/115076                                                     
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
 1 
Action for Cities: The Thatcher Government and Inner City Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In 1985, the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher personally drove the bulldozer 
that inaugurated the demolition of the Victorian Broad Street Station in the City of 
London, making way for new modern office development. In a speech on the 
occasion she lamented that ‘we live in an era of conservation’ and hoped that we 
might come to ‘build the best of our own time to match the achievements of Adam 
and Inigo Jones.’ In the very same week that she was driving a bulldozer into the 
1860s ironwork of Broad Street Station, Thatcher also purchased a new neo-Georgian 
Barratt Home in Dulwich, described in the Spectator as ‘vulgar and incompetently 
designed.’1  What to make of these two seemingly opposed actions by the same 
woman in the same week? Perhaps nothing but philistinism links these two events. 
Then again perhaps this dichotomy of capitalist ruthlessness and bumptious nostalgia 
is revealing of an uneasy synthesis of the ideals of heritage and enterprise at the heart 
of Thatcherism. 
That cities might provide the key to understanding Thatcherism was a driving 
force behind three of the most illuminating observers of Thatcher’s Britain. Patrick 
Wright’s Journey Through Ruins, which is ironically dedicated to Lady Margaret 
Thatcher herself, saw Dalston Lane as ‘an open archaeological site in which the story 
of the nation’s post-war history can be traced out in unexpected detail’.2 In Theatres 
of Memory, Raphael Samuel tried to wrest the concept of heritage away from 
Thatcherism, seeing it instead as a potentially radical force.3 Lastly, Patrick Keiller’s 
film London, as he put it himself, viewed ‘changes in the detail of the landscape, as 
                                               
1 ‘Dulwich Vulgarity’, Spectator, 10 August 1985, 5. 
2 P. Wright, Journey Through Ruins (London, 1991), 32. 
3 R. Samuel, Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture 
(London, 1994). 
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spectators at some sporting event might watch the opposition winning’.4 His narrative 
was one in which a suburban Conservative Party was effectively at war with cities. It 
is perhaps peculiar then that in the extensive scholarship on the meaning and 
progenitors of Thatcherism urban issues are seen as far less central than, firstly its 
economic approach, and secondly its sense of moral crusade.5 The 2012 book of 
essays, Making Thatcher’s Britain, for example – has no urban element. A recent 
four-volume collection presenting the most significant writing about Thatcher also 
ignores urban issues.6 This is despite the fact that the repercussions of Thatcherism on 
cities and urban communities remain deeply controversial; a recent ‘non-partisan’ 
academic conference titled Thatcherism Now held in Liverpool received protests and 
physical threats.7 
This article reintroduces the issue of the inner city into the project of 
understanding the Thatcher government. Through exploring how the Thatcher 
government formed urban policy in the 1980s, I want to make a contribution to the 
debate of whether 1979 saw a definite break with past approaches, or whether it is 
better seen as a continuation of the period of confusion and retreat which characterises 
much of the 1970s. Furthermore, I want to ask how much new policy ideas really did 
amount to a particularly Thatcherite, or indeed a neoliberal, urbanism, or whether it 
was more a case of returning to the admixture of dirigisme and deregulation that had 
long been at the heart of Tory approaches – albeit dressed up with new terminologies 
and often in new neo-vernacular styling. These questions are important for a broader 
issue of how we periodise the changes to cities in the post-war period.      
                                               
4 P. Keiler, View from the Train: Cities and Other Landscapes (London, 2013) 
5 For an overview of recent scholarship see R. Saunders, ‘The Many Lives of 
Margaret Thatcher’, English Historical Review, 82 (2017), 638-658 
6 Margaret Thatcher, ed. T. Bale (London, 2015) 
7 https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/thatcherism-conference-
planned-liverpool-its-13961587 accessed 15 Jan 2018. 
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In asking the question of whether there was such a thing as a Thatcherite 
urbanism, this article reopens a debate, ongoing during the period itself. Many argued 
that there was a radical break towards a new market orientated approach in dealing 
with cities; but other commentators held that whatever the government’s ideological 
commitments, these were soon abandoned in the face of the difficulties, and therefore 
stressed a period of consolidation and continuity with the whole post-war period.8 
Now is a good time to re-ignite this debate, not least because of the benefit of opened 
archives. There was a large scholarly literature dealing with the Thatcher 
government’s inner city policy, published through the 1980s and into the 1990s.9 This 
tended to be written from a social sciences background, aiming to assess the 
effectiveness of urban policy in resolving inner city issues. The cumulative message 
of these texts was that urban policy had pursued an ideologically driven agenda that 
had exacerbated the inner city problem. This article uses the archives that have been 
opened since this first wave of scholarship to explore how the concept of the ‘inner 
city’ had in structuring the government’s policy and self-presentation – regardless of 
the putative efficacy of interventions.  
 
The Inner City 
                                               
8 See, A. Thornley, Urban planning under Thatcherism: the challenge of the market 
(London, 1993) for a summing up of the debate. 
9 P. Lawless, ‘British inner urban policy post 1979’, Policy and politics, 14.2 (1988), 
152-174; N. Deakin, and J. Edwards, The enterprise culture and the inner city 
(London, 1993), M. Parkinson, ‘The Thatcher Government’s inner urban policy, 
1979-1989, a review’, Town planning review, 60.4 (1989), 421-440; Tackling the 
inner cities, the 1980s reviewed, Prospects for the 1990s, ed. S. MacGregor and B. 
Pimlott (Oxford, 1990); H. Butcher et al., Local government and Thatcherism 
(London, 1990); A. Thornley, Urban Planning under Thatcherism: The challenge of 
the market (London, 1991); K. Shaw, Action for Cities, A Critical Review of Urban 
Policy since 1979 (Newcastle, 1989); B. Robson, Those Inner Cities, Reconciling the 
Economic and Social Aims of Urban Policy (Oxford, 1988). 
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The inner city is an exceptionally fruitful vantage point from which to try and 
understand the Thatcherite project, as it was an issue that touched upon so many of 
the central anxieties about the state and society during the period. The concept of the 
inner city was a spatially manifested locus for arguments about physical, social and 
economic decline; a prism modulated by issues ranging from race,10 the north-south 
divide, the persistence of poverty and social polarisation,11 to deindustrialisation, and 
increasingly to law and order,12 and the perceived breakdown of civil society and the 
family. Its very indeterminacy as a term made it peculiarly able to act as a shorthand, 
magnetically drawing to it a whole host of issues. A report on the issue by 
Department of the Environment (DoE) civil servant Eric Sorensen highlighted the 
definitional issue of the term ‘inner city’: 
‘Inner Cities’ has become the generic term for urban areas with 
problems. It is often applied to areas which are neither in cities nor 
in their inner core. It covers a multitude of problems – eg 
environmental decay, rundown housing estates, industrial decline, 
very high localised rates of unemployment, social and racial 
deprivation, drugs and crime. Moreover, the public focus can 
change, sometimes very quickly as, for example, when there are 
‘riots’ and the media seek to identify the ‘underlying causes’. The 
term ‘inner cities’ has however taken such firm root in the panoply 
of journalistic clichés that we are probably stuck with it.13 
 
Like the word ‘slum’ in previous decades, the term ‘inner city’, through its 
very indeterminacy, could act both as a rallying cry to galvanise action directed at 
urban poverty, but it also had the potential to act as a slur, anathematizing sections of 
the population, especially Black and Asian ethnic minorities. Increasingly ‘inner city’ 
                                               
10 J. Bourne, ‘“May we bring harmony”? Thatcher’s legacy on “race”’, Race and 
class, 55.1 (2013), 87-91, D. Feldman, ‘Why the English like turbans: A history of 
multiculturalism in one country’, in Structures and Transformations in Modern 
Britain: Essays for Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge, 2011) 
11 I. Gilmour, Dancing with dogma (London, 1992), 104-41 
12 S. Farrall and C. Hay, ‘Not so tough on crime?: Why weren’t the Thatcher 
Governments more radical in reforming the criminal justice system?’, The British 
Journal of Criminology, 50.3 (2010), 550-69 
13 E. Sorensen, ‘Report on the Inner Cities’, 1987, PREM 19/2463 
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referred not only to the ‘traditional core areas of cities’, but also to what were 
described as ‘the many large and badly designed council estates’.14 ‘ The period was 
part of a long term shift in the perceived location of urban problems – from ‘Victorian 
slums’ and ‘twilight areas’ to ‘concrete jungles’, a shift that arguably culminated in 
prominent and repeated use of the term ‘sink estate’ by future Labour Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair.15 As will be seen, that urban modernism could be construed as amongst 
the key culprits for urban deprivation was useful for the Conservative party, as it 
added ammunition to its attack on local authorities. 
There were three key moments during the 1980s when the issue of the inner 
cities flared into national consciousness: following the 1981 and 1985 riots, the 
former leading to an official report by Lord Scarman and the latter provoking the 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s 1985 Faith in the City report; and after the 1987 election 
victory, when Thatcher took personal responsibility for the inner cities and 
inaugurated the Action for Cities policy drive. Searching for the term in Hansard 
shows its growing pervasiveness from the mid-1970s onwards, reaching its apogee in 
the mid-to-late 1980s with Action for Cities, and then dropping off in the 1990s.16 
                                               
14 Report of the Home Secretary’s Policy group on law and order, the inner cities and 
drugs – December 1986. CRD 4/9/56. See D. Sim, ‘Urban Deprivation: not just the 
inner city’, Area, 16.4 (1984), 299-306. 
15 B. Campkin, Remaking London: Decline and Regeneration in Urban Culture 
(London, 2013), 99. 
16 https://hansard.parliament.uk/search?startDate=1971-01-24&endDate=2004-01-
24&searchTerm=%22inner%20city%22&partial=False accessed 15 Jan 2018. 
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The issue had gained in influence throughout the 1970s, with cross-party 
initiatives culminating in the 1977 Inner Area White Paper, and subsequent 1978 
Inner Urban Areas Act.18 During the 1980s there was a continuation of the long-term 
decline of many of these areas, made more precipitous by the intensification of 
deindustrialisation following monetarist policies and an inhospitable international 
economy, and the subsequent spiralling levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, the 
Thatcher administration were perhaps surprisingly willing to confront issues of the 
inner city. This was in part because it was construed as a long term, inexorable, and 
remorseless issue, on which the opposition were relatively weak. It therefore diverted 
attention from issues on which the Conservatives were more vulnerable such as the 
economy and unemployment. As a Conservative Party Research Department 
memorandum put it, ‘I have not noticed any great desire by the Opposition to debate 
the inner cities, and what a mess some Labour councils are making of them.’19 The 
inner city was a useful concept for the Conservatives, as it did not restrict debate to 
                                               
17 https://hansard.parliament.uk/search?startDate=1971-01-24&endDate=2004-01-
24&searchTerm=%22inner%20city%22&partial=False accessed 15 Jan 2018. 
18 O. Saumarez Smith, ‘The inner city crisis and the end of urban modernism in 1970s 
Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 27.4 (2016),  578-98. 
19 CPA, CRD 4/8/14. 
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mono-causal or macro-economic issues: ‘The Labour Party wish to restrict discussion 
to unemployment and Government spending. I feel that we should keep the debate as 
wide as possible, in order to show there are no easy solutions, and also to force 
attention away from our obvious Achilles’ heels…’20 It is notable that the Church of 
England’s report Faith in the City was a far more sustained and damning indictment 
of Government action and inaction in inner city areas than anything that came from 
the political left.21 
All in all the inner city issue dominated a vast amount of legislative and 
ministerial effort, taking up a significant proportion of the intellectual energy, if not 
necessarily the resources, of most domestic Ministries.  As New Society argued,  
The political will to do something we must assume to be real enough. 
However uninterested ministers might sometimes appear to be to the 
plight of the urban poor, the government has no vested interest in the 
continuation of inner city deprivation and decline. Indeed, Mrs 
Thatcher at least has vested considerable personal capital in her 
crusade to do something about the inner cities.’22  
 
Nicholas Ridley made a similar point when he argued that, ‘Even those who cannot 
find it in their hearts to credit us with good intentions might at least rise to the cynical 
view that no political party deliberately sets out to alienate vast chunks of the 
electorate by pointless exercises in malign neglect.’23 Inner city effort was spread 
across central government, so that by 1989 it was possible to identify at least thirty-
five separate schemes impacting on the inner city – administered by at least nine 
departments or quangos.24 Although the multiplicity of departments involved was 
                                               
20 M. Kohler to T. Hutt, 28 July 1981, CPA, CRD/D/8/24. 
21 Faith in the City, a Call for Action by Church and Nation (London, 1985) 
22 ‘Tackling the inner cities’, New Society, 11 March 1988, 3. 
23 TNA, PREM 19/2462, ‘Draft on speech on Inner city issues to Greater London 
Area Conservative political centre 6 July 1987’. 
24 P. Lawless, ‘Urban policy in the Thatcher decade’, 19. 
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open to criticism for the lack of co-ordination it entailed, it is also evidence that the 
issue ran through all domestic areas of Thatcherite policy.  
Neoliberalism 
 
Much writing on British neo-liberalism has been concerned with exploring its 
intellectual roots. Keith Joseph is a key figure for many such narratives, which seek to 
understand the intellectual constellation of ideas leading to Thatcherism – due to his 
somewhat unusual interest in ideas and his demonstrable influence. There is a case to 
be made that he had something of this role in the field of urban policy. It is 
remarkable that Joseph had been Minister of Housing and Local Government during 
the high point of Harold Macmillan’s Conservative-led government, overseeing the 
move to more high-rise flats and radical city centre redevelopment.25 His conversion 
against urban modernism paralleled his conversion against Keynesianism. He 
congratulated Michael Heseltine on being appointed to the Department of the 
Environment with the words, ‘Well done. You’ll find lots of problems in your new 
job. I caused many of them.’26 Issues of urban planning and architecture had been 
crucial for many on the New Right during the 1970s, and the rejection of architectural 
modernism was often proclaimed as exemplary of larger battles.27 Joseph’s 1980 
Bibliography of Freedom contains a prominent section on urban policy. Urban policy 
was an area in which, according to Joseph, ‘the failure of interventionist policies and 
planning has been conspicuous’.28  The list of books is heavily weighted towards titles 
                                               
25 O. Saumarez Smith, ‘Central government and town centre redevelopment in 
Britain, 1959-1966’, Historical Journal, 58.1 (2015) 
26 B. Harrison, ‘Joseph, Keith Sinjohn, Baron Joseph (1918–1994)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) 
27 R. Scruton, ‘The architecture of Stalinism’, Cambridge Review, 97 (26 November 
1976), 36-41; P. Hutber, The decline and fall of the middle class and how it can fight 
back (London, 1977). Thatcher herself had been lent a copy of David Watkin’s 
Morality and Architecture although she found it tough going, C. Moore, Margaret 
Thatcher: The Authorised Biography, vol. One: Not for turning (London, 2013), .  
28 A bibliography of freedom (London, 1980), 20. 
 9 
from America, notably two books by Jane Jacobs: The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities and The Economy of Cities, described by Joseph as ‘two brilliant 
studies of the failure of central planning and the virtues of the decentralized and 
spontaneous order.’ It also included books such as Martin Anderson’s Federal 
Bulldozer29 and Edward Banfield’s The Unheavenly City Revisited.30 Cumulatively 
the list shows how the perception of the failure of transatlantic modernist urban 
renewal policy, helped to delegitimise a whole gamut of approaches.31 
 An indicative book on the list, and one that would be echoed in many texts 
issuing from British right wing commentators, was Edward Banfield’s The 
Unheavenly City Revisited.32 It is well known in the field of economics how a set of 
radical ideas emanating from a transatlantic coterie of academics entered the blood 
stream of British mainstream political thought.33 Edward Banfield is perhaps now a 
peripheral figure in the pantheon of the New Right, but he was deeply embedded in 
the academic networks of the period.34 His diagnosis of the American urban crisis in 
Unheavenly city (1970) and its revision, Unheavenly city revisited (1974), can be seen 
to have acted as a blueprint for the way many in the Conservative party talked about 
urban issues. Banfield was sanguine about a supposed urban crisis in American cities, 
pointing to the much worse poverty in the countryside, and argued that any 
inequalities or problems of urban life in cities would resolve themselves naturally, and 
that government intervention, far from resolving issues, actually served to exacerbate 
                                               
29 M. Anderson, The Federal bulldozer (New York, 1964), See S. Conn, Americans 
against the city (Oxford, 2014) for a discussion of Anderson’s influence on the New 
Right into the 1980s. 157-163. 
30 E. Banfield, The Unheavenly city revisited (Boston, 1974). 
31 C. Klemek, The transatlantic collapse of urban renewal, postwar urbanism from 
New York to Berlin (Chicago, 2011). 
32 E. Banfield, The Unheavenly city revisited (Boston, 1974). 
33 D. Stedman Jones, Masters of the universe (Princeton, 2012). 
34 A fascinating first-hand account of Banfield and his place in neo-liberal intellectual 
networks can be found in O. Letwin, Hearts and minds (London, 2017). 
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them. He also, controversially, argued that African Americans were not substantially 
the victims of racial prejudice.  
 Although Banfield’s ideas came from a different context, they found an echo 
in a wide range of Conservative publications, across the 1980s.35 Perhaps it was 
Alfred Sherman who first applied such arguments to a British context.36 We might 
take Anthony Steen’s New Life for Old Cities as indicative of these kinds of 
arguments. In the book he argued: 
Nor should we presume that the inner cities’ problems have arisen because of 
previous benign or malign neglect – for they haven’t. On the contrary the cities have 
been recognised for a long time as posing special political, social and economic 
problems. It was because of these that increasing sums of money were pumped into 
declining areas, in the erroneous belief that this would provide the answer – but it 
didn’t. It has merely led to further problems and a mistaken diagnosis which ensured 
the wrong medicine continued to be administered in ever increasing doses and not 
surprisingly the patient has now taken a turn for the worse.  
 
 Arguments like this were especially adept at gaining traction amongst 
commentators because they fitted into two other metanarratives about the post-war 
period. One was the perceived failure of urban modernism; the other was the 
purported sclerosis, venality and inefficiency of local government. Steen outlined a 
narrative where the ‘initial culprits’ had been the planners, ‘whose sheer folly it was 
to have believed that wholesale clearance of inner city neighbourhoods could bulldoze 
away the city’s problems.’37 Policies of dispersal and slum clearance had led to ‘the 
Exodus’ of people and jobs. Meanwhile, local authorities had stockpiled local land, 
and encouraged small businesses to move out of the inner city to greenfield sites. The 
case against urban modernism and local authorities, whether it was accurate or not, 
                                               
35 For example K. Clarke, A Free Market and the Inner Cities (London, 1987); F. 
Mount, Property and Poverty, an agenda for the mid-80s (London, 1984); A. Steen, 
New Life for Old Cities (1981).  
36 E.g. A. Sherman, ‘Counting the cost of new towns’, Daily Telegraph, 10 August 
1973, 14. 
37 See also, ‘What went wrong with the inner cities’, The Economist, 10 April 1982, p. 
37 Saumarez Smith, ‘The Inner City Crisis’. 
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carried huge force, because such arguments were pervasive and largely unchallenged, 
and were as likely to come from left-wing as right-wing sources. At the heart of a 
neoliberal attitude to cities then, was a belief that the very process of government 
intervention was the culprit for urban decline. ‘Benign neglect’ might therefore be 
‘less wasteful and damaging’ than costly intervention as it risked destroying ‘an areas 
“immune system” and thus its ability to recover on its own accord.’38  Such arguments 
were increasingly enunciated in the moral terms of how ‘dependency culture’ was 
caused by state intervention, and how an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ would flourish when 
it was taken away:  
For in my opinion it is precisely in our inner cities that free market solutions have not 
been properly applied for fifty years. It is in those areas more than any other where 
the elements of individual enterprise, competition and consumer choice have been 
most lacking. It is there more than anywhere else that the culture of dependence has 
survived under the dead hand of municipal socialism. 39 
 
III. Enterprise Zones, Development Corporation, and Right to Buy 
 That such neoliberal ideas were certainly being discussed is clear, but how far 
they succeeded in gaining traction presents a messier picture. After the 1979 election 
Keith Joseph pushed for a wide-ranging rethink of inner city policy. But Joseph was 
unable to steer the course of Government so easily towards new ideas – and we 
should be cautious about seeing too direct an influence of neoliberal ideas in this area. 
The Government were unwilling to move away from the approach set down by the 
1977 White Paper, especially as this itself had grown from a bipartisan movement, 
having been initiated by Peter Walker in the early 1970s. As it was argued against 
Joseph, ‘Any new review of the interaction of public policies in the context of the 
inner cities would be complex and prolonged.’40 Michael Heseltine’s first statement 
                                               
38 CPA CAB 164/1548, Policy Unit on ‘It took a riot’, 3 September 1981. 
39 K. Clarke, A Free Market and the Inner Cities (London, 1987). 
40 Vile to Pattison, 7 October 1979, TNA PREM 19/577. 
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on inner city issues was written in direct contradistinction to Joseph’s suggestion for a 
‘thorough review’41 and in spite of Geoffrey Howe’s protestations that Heseltine was 
proposing an ‘uncosted extension of public sector activity’ that was out of tune with 
the ‘thrust of our philosophy’.42 Heseltine argued that in most cases ‘existing 
machinery, streamlined and adjusted, will be capable of carrying developments 
forward in the inner cities’43 – but in special cases, most notably in Liverpool and the 
London Docklands, Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations would be 
deployed. 
In common with many other areas of the welfare state where expenditure 
continued to expand under Thatcher’s auspices, many of the interventionist policies 
inaugurated in the Inner Urban Areas Act (1978) continued to grow during her 
premiership. The Urban Programme had an increase in funding from £93 million in 
1978-9 to £338m in 1984/5, whilst overall the programme cities receiving funding 
doubled from £1 to £2 billion pounds between 1979 and 1985, an increase of 6 per 
cent in real terms even taking inflation into account. The money directed to 
partnership areas similarly increased from £700 million to £1,400 million in those six 
years. The derelict land grant doubled in size, - and could show off that it reclaimed 
an area the size of Grimsby every two months. There was also a very significant 
increase in the granting of Housing Improvement Grants – 105,000 houses belonging 
to councils were improved in 1984 compared with 74,000 in 1978.44 Even taking into 
account the fact that the Rate Support Grant was being dramatically reduced at the 
same time, all of this suggests that the Government were not abandoning many of the 
interventionist policies of the previous administration.  
                                               
41 T 380/865 Lord Trenchard to Michael Heseltine, 3 September 1979. 
42 G. Howe to Heseltine, 7 September 1979. 
43 M. Heseltine, ‘Statement on Inner City Policy’ 6 September 1979, TNA, T380/865. 
44 ‘Urban Cities Brief’, 11 December 1985, CPA CRD/B/11/4. 
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The problem was that the goal was ever receding, as jobs drained out at an 
ever-more precipitous rate, much quicker than any intervention could keep up with. In 
many ways inner city aid ended up functioning as a stand in for the regional policy of 
the post-war period.45 As a review of the interventions of the Thatcher period summed 
up, ‘It is a curious comment on Thatcherism, however, that the administration most 
committed to a reduction in the role of the state, and in the need for an independent 
private sector, has spent more on specific urban regeneration and employment 
schemes and incentives to private investment in urban areas than any other in recent 
history.’46 Within this expenditure there was a perceptible shift in focus, away from 
financing social projects, towards those intended to stimulate the economy and job 
creation, as for example in the Urban Programme. 47 Nevertheless, in doing so, the 
government were not diverting from the thinking developed during the 1970s: which 
stressed that inner city decline resulted from external economic processes, and not 
because of changes happening to the population. 
                                               
45 ‘Regional policy under the axe’, the Economist, 19 February 1983, 21. 
46 Tackling the inner cities, 9. 
47 Department of the Environment, The Urban Programme Fact Sheets 1985/6 
(London, 1985) 
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48 
The difference with the approach set out in the 1977 White Paper was not in 
the commitment to area-based programmes of economic renewal, but in a pronounced 
effort to bypass local authorities. It was acknowledged, at least behind the scenes, that 
‘the major change from the 1977 Inner Cities White Paper which saw local authorities 
as the key agents in the delivery of urban policy. They are now, in some areas, part of 
the problem.’49 The other difference was that there was an acknowledgement, at least 
behind closed doors, that money spent was not necessarily going to reverse decline, 
but that policy should be directed at trying to ‘ease the pains of change, not attempt to 
reverse the process.’50  
The same contradictory and ambiguous outcomes with regard to a supposed 
neo-liberalism is also to an extent true of the more overtly novel urban policies rolled 
out during the early Thatcher years. Enterprise zones were attempts to encourage 
private investment into inner city areas by offering exemptions on bureaucracy, 
taxation and, planning regulations. The idea was brought to public attention by a 1978 
                                               
48 Department of the Environment, The Urban Programme Fact Sheets 1985/6 
(London, 1985), 44 
49 E. Sorensen, ‘Inner Cities report’, TNA, PREM 19/2463. 
50 Letter from Robert Young to Margaret Thatcher, 12 October 1984, TNA Prem 
19/1615. 
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speech at a special Bow Group dinner at the Waterman’s Arms in the Isle of Dogs by 
Geoffrey Howe (although Joseph had posited something similar earlier51), and show 
some influence of left-field planning ideas of Peter Hall (although Howe himself 
could not have been clearer that Hall’s Freeport proposal was far too dramatic and 
‘not the one I am putting forward’.52) Stephen Brooke sees enterprise zones as having 
‘physically [written] neo-liberalism into the language of some British cities’,53 whilst 
Sam Wetherell views them as ‘arguably neo-liberalism’s purist policy expression’.54  
As implemented through legislation passed in 1980, initially in seven inner 
city areas55, enterprise zones were rather less radical than Howe’s initial proposal, and 
indeed were criticised by many from the Right, including Anthony Steen, for the way 
that they were an intervention into the free market in favour of areas where the private 
sector had manifestly failed. They did include significant tax exemptions, including a 
holiday on rates for the first ten years – but, crucially, the local authority was 
reimbursed for the lost revenue directly from the Treasury.56 Proposals to withdraw 
regional grants and subsidies from businesses located in enterprise zones were 
dropped after pressure from industry and unions. As businesses in the area continued 
to receive all the benefits of public services, what tax exemptions that did occur 
amounted to little more than public subsidy. As it was argued in 1984, enterprise 
zones ‘became, instead of an experiment in free enterprise and non-intervention, an 
                                               
51 The regeneration of local economies, 84. 
52 Sir G. Howe, ‘Liberating Free Enterprise: a New Experiment’, Speech to the Bow 
Group, 26 June 1978, Margaret Thatcher Archive, 2/1/1/39. 
53 S. Brooke, ‘Living in “new times”: historicizing 1980s Britain’, History Compass, 
12.1 (2014), p. 20-32. 
54 S. Wetherell ‘Freedom Planned: Enterprise Zones and Urban Non-Planning in Post-
War Britain’, Twentieth Century British History (2016). 
55 Not all enterprise zones would be in inner city areas or areas of dereliction, see for 
example Wellingborough. 
56 S. M. Butler, ‘Enterprise zones: pioneering in the inner city’, New tools for 
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instrument to encourage the location or relocation of industry in selected areas by 
means of a spatially-discriminatory fiscal regime and a heavy promotional effort.’57 
There was some limited planning deregulation, much diluted by the time it came to 
the legislation, including a streamlined procedure for applying for permits.58 This did 
not however amount to anything like the much more far-reaching deregulation of 
building licenses in 1954.59 Peter Hall’s own view was that enterprise zones were ‘a 
particularly poignant example of the way that, especially in Britain, radical ideas are 
taken on board by the establishment, only to be sanitized into something completely 
harmless.’60 The cost, both direct and indirect, to government was substantial.61  
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) are another area where it would be 
a mistake to overplay either their novelty, or see them as a symbol of a new 
ideologically neoliberal approach to cities.62 For one thing the UDCs were openly 
modelled on the post-war New Town development corporations, which had been set 
up by Attlee’s Labour government in 1946 – hardly a neoliberal exemplar:  
One of the most notable examples of positive planning in Britain during this 
century has been the New Town Programme…. What is now proposed is the 
use of a management mechanism similar to the one used to create New Towns 
to redress the problems of inner cities and utilise their existing infrastructure 
which is at present running at well below its capacity.63 
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 The idea of using new town mechanics to redevelop inner city areas had been 
mooted as far back as the 1960s, by groups such as the Society for the Promotion of 
Urban Renewal.64 Godfrey Hodgson had suggested a version of the idea under the 
moniker of an ‘Old Town Renewal Agency’ in Crossbow as far back as 1962 – an 
article that influenced Geoffrey Howe.65 The concept had certainly been kicking 
about in central government departments,66 and Michael Heseltine was able to dust 
off the concept from his prior stint as parliamentary undersecretary at the DoE under 
Peter Walker when he took over at the department in 1979.67 The 1977 White Paper 
had posited them as a possibility, but criticised their ‘lack of accountability to the 
local electorate.’68 As one commentator put it, ‘Urban development corporations are 
powerful quangos, more symptomatic of Heath-style corporatism than what is usually 
understood by Thatcherism.’69 The Daily Telegraph went even further, complaining 
in 1987 that they were ‘more of a socialist concept than a child of a Tory 
administration.’70  
Of course the efforts of the UDCs (as with the enterprise zones) were intended 
to ‘pump prime’ for private development, rather than primarily carrying out 
development by the state. This was in part inspired by the American example, 
especially the redevelopment of Baltimore harbour.71 Urban development grants, 
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based on the American urban development action grants, designed to attract private 
investment into inner city areas by making grants available to support capital 
investment projects developed jointly by local authorities and the private sector. £60 
million was available in 1983-4.72  
Right to buy has been well-served in the historiography, but the way that it 
was a key facet of the Government’s approach to the inner city crisis has not been 
stressed. Tim Barron, a property developer advising the Conservative party, spoke for 
many Tories in his zealous belief ‘that home ownership is not only good for the soul 
but is an utterly essential ingredient if we are to restore to our inner area populations a 
sense of pride, a feeling of responsibility to others and a desire to improve and 
preserve their environment and living standards all of which are needed if they are to 
become fit places to bring up children and enjoy a healthy family life.’73 A belief in 
the active benefits of the gentrification in these inner areas was also at play, whereby 
‘attracting back the better off middle classes, who would help give the communities 
greater stability, who demand better standards of education and other services and, 
who would help make the inner areas an attractive alternative to suburbia.’74 
Conservative MP Nirj Deva-Aditya also saw home ownership as an effective 
palliative for the issues brought about by the 1981 riots, arguing that ‘the most 
effective way of curbing racial tension is to encourage the formation of a property and 
capital owning black minority with a vested interest in preserving and improving the 
urban fabric of our inner cities.’75 Projects of improvement were actively aimed at 
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‘drawing in middle and higher income families too - people who can turn their skills 
in leading and organising to community benefit. In this way run-down areas have a 
better chance of stepping off the downward spiral of depopulation, dereliction and 
dependence and of clambering aboard a virtuous circle of improvement, investment, 
owner-occupation and repopulation.’76 Right to buy however would only have limited 
effect in the inner city. This was in part because flats made up 30% of council 
dwellings, more in urban areas, but accounted for only 4% of council house sales.77 In 
an area such as Tower Hamlets local authority accommodation continued to account 
for more than 80% of housing in 1986.78  
Housing was the one exception to the general phenomenon that the Thatcher 
governments failed, as Nicholas Ridley ruefully admitted, in ‘controlling, let alone 
cutting, expenditure on public services.’79 The cuts to local authority housing schemes 
amounted to a remarkable 75% of the government’s total spending reductions 
between 1980/1 and 1983/4. During the Thatcher decade the expenditure total for 
housing fell in real terms from £7.3 billion to £1.9 billion.80 Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to downplay the radicalism of the Thatcher government even in this area. As 
many have argued, policies such as right to buy had a long ancestry within 
Conservative thought.81 Peter Walker, hardly a neoliberal, had a more far-reaching 
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conception of the policy than could be countenanced by Thatcher.82 Right-to-buy was 
extensively countenanced by Wilson and Callaghan’s Policy Unit.83 More 
importantly, the approach to council housing also built on the long-term trend away 
from modernist renewal towards rehabilitation, forcefully signalled in the 1977 White 
Paper. 84 
The estate Cantril Farm, in Knowlsey on the eastern outskirts of Liverpool 
was a flagship scheme for the Conservatives. This scheme provided the blueprint for 
the Conservative backed attempts at diversifying tenure and privatising management, 
which would culminate in the Estate Action initiative from 1985. Cantril Farm was 
bought from Knowsley council for £7.5 million by a consortium of Barclays Bank, 
the Abbey National and Barratt’s development, and renamed Stockbridge Village. A 
five-year development programme was underwritten by an investment package of 
private and public funds. Owner occupation increased from 2 to 15 per cent, and 
Shelter noted that ‘featureless blocks of low-rise housing have been transformed into 
a suburban idyll of quiet cul de sacs, complete with planter boxes, coach-lamps and 
freshly painted Georgian front doors.’85  
Although neoliberal ideas were certainly approved of and discussed by many 
Conservatives, when one turns to actual policy the picture is messier. With the 
exception of housing, most aspects of Thatcher’s urban policy involved an expansion 
of the state. What all aspects of this urban policy do have in common though, is the 
way that they were diminishing the power of local authorities. If one were looking for 
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overarching theme for what was new about urban policy in the years after 1979, it 
should not be neoliberalism, but the viciousness of the attack on local authorities.  
Bernard Ingham advised Thatcher to answer the question, ‘Is not your entire 
inner city policy designed to marginalise local government?’, with the response:  
No. But equally we cannot allow anti-enterprise, spendthrift, 
irrelevant local government to condemn urban areas to deprivation 
for which the Government is then blamed. The attachment of some 
local authorities to high rates, gay rights, Nicaragua and nuclear free 
zones does not offer much hope to their residents. For too long some 
local authorities have conducted a guerrilla war against the 
Government at the expense of their rate-payers. It has got to stop.86  
 
Although this was ostensibly a denial that inner city policy was calculated foremost to 
subvert local authority power, it nonetheless inadvertently revealed the sheer 
antipathy towards local authorities. It was perhaps unsurprising then, as New Society 
argued, cumulatively inner city policy ‘adds up to something which more closely 
resembles a war on Labour local authorities than on urban decay.’87 
 
Action for Cities 
Towards the Government’s third term there was a recognition that there needed to be 
a renewed attack on inner cities, with the Conservatives looking to tie together the 
disparate parts of the approach so far taken. There was recognised to be a ‘lack of 
coherence’88 in inner city policy, and it wasn’t completely clear what was the answer 
to the questions: ‘Is our approach bottom up, top down or a mixture? Is it 
deregulatory or is it interventionist through grants and tax incentives?’89 As with 
much policy formation in the third term, there was also the difficulty of balancing the 
need to show that the party was not, as Thatcher herself put the problem, ‘stale and 
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running out of ideas’, whilst also protecting themselves ‘against the jibe: if these ideas 
were so good, why haven’t you introduced them before.’90 Furthermore, there was a 
feeling that the Government were ‘not receiving sufficient credit for what has been 
achieved or what is underway.’91 The way inner city policy was interconnected with 
hostility towards local authorities also became increasingly direct, as the government 
moved the crosshairs of their focus onto local authorities in their last term: ‘The next 
major institution to be reformed by the Government – the first two having been the 
trade unions and the nationalised industries – should be local government.’92 This was 
also the term of the poll tax and Thatcher’s downfall.  
 In the policy discussions that led up to the resulting Action for Cities 
programme, a fissure is discernible between the political need and desire to be seen to 
do something, and the free market belief that intervention should not even be 
countenanced.  Norman Blackwell and Hartley Booth were Thatcher’s advisors 
pushing most strongly for a clear ideologically defined position, and they were 
‘nervous that the result may simply be a re-hash of the traditional DoE approach’:  
We are in danger of losing sight of our basic philosophy – that local 
leadership is the key source of initiative, while Government’s role is 
primarily to create the climate to release enterprise (not to ‘solve’ inner 
city problems through top down intervention).93 
 
The main reason the focus of inner city policy was moved to the cabinet office, with 
Kenneth Clarke appointed Minister with special responsibilities for the inner cities, 
was that Thatcher felt the need to appear ‘a “hands on” Prime Minister so far as inner 
cities go’94 But it was also because Nicholas Ridley at the DoE, which had tended to 
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lead on inner city policy in the past, was scornful of the very idea that there should be 
an inner city policy as such at all: 
His Private Secretary says that Mr. Ridley believes there is no such thing as inner city 
policy. There is only policy towards housing, transport, social services, blacks and so 
on... If local firms can win business by being fully competitive so much the better. 
But if they can’t, the Government should not interfere with market forces in order to 
help them… The same beliefs explain why he is sceptical about any ideas for 
coordinating inner city policies and presentation.95 
 
There was a contradiction at the heart of Action for Cities. The government 
felt the need to be seen to be proactive in tackling the inner city problem, so much so 
that Thatcher made it a centrepiece of her third term, and vested considerable personal 
capital in the crusade. This was obviously at odds with the belief that there was a 
limited amount that Government could do, and that intervention was often 
counterproductive. That the results were largely more of the same, albeit repackaged 
was freely admitted: as Thatcher put it herself at the press conference launching the 
initiative: ‘I don’t think there is a single new policy here, and there is not a great deal 
of new money.’96 It was in large part promotional, advertising what was being 
achieved: 
Although much has been done by Departments to ensure that Government gets credit 
for its effort and investment in inner cities, people are still largely unaware of the 
extent of its contribution. I would like to see our contribution to inner city projects 
acknowledged by Departments using prominent Action for Cities signboards on all 
their projects within the £3bn total and for all related Press Notices to be in the 
standard Action for Cities format.97  
 
  
 Rather than a new White Paper the government published a glossy 
brochure. As Labour MP Donald Dewer complained, ‘what have we been given, apart 
from a gathering of bric-a-brac from the past ingeniously packaged to give the 
impression of generosity?’98 Such presentational efforts could be defended as having 
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an important role in challenging stereotypes, and ‘selling a message of motivation and 
hope’.99 Something similar was happening with Lord Young’s concurrent massaging 
of the unemployment figures. A centrepiece of Action for Cities were a series of 
breakfasts around the country, where businessmen were encouraged to invest in inner 
city areas, in a long tradition of civic boosterism, but with local authority figures 
notably excluded.100 It is nevertheless difficult to escape the feeling that all the 
propulsive talk about inner cities didn’t amount to much. At its worst, Action for 
Cities’ concentration on producing results that could be trumpeted involved 
something worryingly close to the creation of Potemkin Villages for the enterprise 
culture: ‘In due course we will want to be able to demonstrate that our policies have 
had a significant impact on specific locations. New initiatives therefore need to be 
targeted on a relatively small number of areas where we can expect to see 
improvement.’101 
 
 Conclusion 
Thatcher herself struggled to find the right tone in presenting issues about the inner 
cities, and she too easily risked ‘sounding patronising and uncaring’, as her advisors 
warned her.102 The years of her premiership nevertheless saw a vast amount of effort 
expended on the issue. The inner cities were important to her and her administration. 
It isn’t so much that inner city issues superseded other domestic concerns such as the 
economy, inequality, race relations, social breakdown, or the devastation of 
manufacturing jobs, but rather that the inner city was an important arena in which 
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these issues could be seen to be grappled with. Many of these issues might well have 
been approached in ways that tackled them without giving any weight whatsoever to 
where they occurred. A coherently neoliberal approach would see any policy in 
favour of one area over another as reinforcing failure. The very concept of a 
‘neoliberal inner city policy’ is therefore potentially oxymoronic. Fundamentally the 
government found it useful to approach domestic issues through the lens of the inner 
city, because the blame for society’s ills could be laid upon long-term processes, and 
on local government.  
              The resulting efforts of central government were muddled. Driven by a desire 
to reduce the state it arguably ended up consisting as much an attack on local 
government, as it was on urban deprivation. Split between the contradictory impulses 
of a free market ideology and the political necessity to be seen to be intervening 
productively, inner city policy became increasingly about presentation and spin. What 
had emerged most clearly in the decade separating the 1977 White Paper on inner 
cities and 1987s Action for Cities programme is not a clearly defined neoliberal 
approach to cities, but the end of the meliorist belief that the inner city problem might 
be solved through government intervention. That this loss of belief didn’t in fact 
result in less intervention is a paradox. 
 There was a clearly defined, and frequently enunciated neoliberal 
philosophy widespread within Conservative circles within central government, stating 
that the inner city problem had come about because free market solutions had not 
been tested. We should however be cautious about seeing this period as presenting a 
new neoliberal polity. From the perspective of those in government neoliberal ideas 
were very far from being enacted, and the approach to the issue remained much more 
piecemeal. There is evidence for a number of explanations for this failure of 
neoliberal ideas gaining traction, whether it is the continued influence of ‘wets’ as 
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well as ‘drys’ within government, Heseltinism as well as Thatcherism, a civil service 
committed to old modes of thinking, or the political impossibility of non-intervention, 
especially following urban riots. Whatever the answer, historians clearly need to be 
cautious about deploying an ideologically motivated programme as the overarching 
explanation for urban change in this period. 
 Inner cities were the places where many of the larger processes negatively 
effecting British society could be seen most vividly, whether it was unemployment, 
deindustrialisation, social polarisation, or antagonistic race relations. This article has 
argued against the primacy of ideology as an explanation for urban change in this 
period. The still nascent historiography of 1980s urban Britain will need to pay 
attention to longer-term historical processes, and be cautious of neat periodizations.103 
This article has focused on the internal urban policy formation of the Thatcher 
Government, but its ultimate conclusion is that we will need to look elsewhere if we 
are to form a full understanding of urban change in the 1980s.  
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